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THE NONSUPREME COURT
Kathleen M. Sullivan*

THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT. By Robert A. Burt. Cambridge:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1992. Pp. 462.
$29.95.
I

The conventional wisdom on what liberals think about the Warren
Court goes something like this: In the beginning there was the Warren
Court and it was good. It desegregated the schools, reapportioned the
legislatures, civilized the station house, unshackled the speech of dissidents, and stayed the hand of government in matters of reproductive
choice. It called this constitutional interpretation. Then came the
critics who called it legislation from the bench. The critics won the
elections. They made all the appointments to the Court for a quarter
of a century. The Warren Court was no more. And liberals retreated
to the wilderness, celebrating the fading memory of the Warren Court
and waiting for its time to come again.
Like any conventional wisdom, this one has partial truth. But it
also overlooks entirely one of the most striking recent trends in constitutional scholarship. As conservatives attacked from without the notion of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation that is
traditionally associated with the Warren Court, an array of liberal and
progressive constitutional scholars lobbed their own critiques of this
notion from within. Robert Burt's The Constitution in Conflict is the
latest entry in this literature of progressive self-criticism. 1 Burt's central thesis is that judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation
violates a fundamental norm of equality that should govern social and
political relations. In his view, the Court heeds this norm when it
serves as a participant in constitutional dialogue rather than an oracle
of constitutional truth. In short, conventional liberal worship of the
Warren Court gets it wrong.
This thesis situates Burt squarely in what might be called the Protestant rather than the Catholic wing of liberal thought on how constitutional interpretation ought to be structured. I borrow this analogy,
of course, from the evocative work of Sanford Levinson2 and Thomas
-

• Professor of Law, Harvard. B.A. 1976, Cornell; B.A. 1978, Oxford; J.D. 1981, Harvard.
Ed. The author thanks Tom Grey and Cass Sunstein for helpful comments.
1. Robert Burt is the Southmayd Professor of Law at the Yale Law School.
2. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
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Grey. 3 For present purposes, the key aspect of this analogy is not the
difference in approaches to text - Protestants look to text alone while
Catholics look to both text and unwritten tradition4 - but the difference in approaches to institutional interpretive authority - Catholics
centralize interpretive authority in the Pope (Supreme Court) while
Protestants decentralize or deinstitutionalize that authority. 5 Justice
Jackson once said, in a kind of constitutional Catholic in-joke, that the
Court is not final because infallible, but infallible because final. 6 Constitutional Protestants see the Court as neither infallible, final, or a
Pope. As the Protestant-leaning Levinson recently put it, those who
would bring about a constitutional Reformation must start with the
"'defetishization'" of the Court.7
How might one go about defetishizing the Court? First, one might
devolve greater authority to interpret the Constitution upon the nonjudicial branches of government. On this view, the Court's interpretation is not hierarchically superior but competes on an equal footing
with that of other branches. Supreme Court rulings bind the parties in
a particular case, but they need not command executive or legislative
acquiescence in the next one. President Reagan's Attorney General
Edwin Meese took a lot of heat for asserting this view in a notorious
1986 speech. 8 But constitutional Protestants thought he had a point. 9
Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt, after all, had each approved defiance of Supreme Court decisions they deemed profoundly
3. See Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
In
borrowing the terms "Catholic" and "Protestant," I mean no interdenominational offense. As
Levinson and Grey pointed out in launching these terms into constitutional theory discourse,
Judaism and Islam also split along lines of textual and institutional difference parallel to those
dividing Christians. See LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 19-27.
Burt does not employ the terms "Catholic" and "Protestant" explicitly in his book. But,
elsewhere in his work, he has invoked comparisons between constitutionalism and religion that
suggest he might not entirely resist the metaphor here. See Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law
and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 466-78 (1984); Robert A. Burt, Precedent
and Authority in Antonin Scalia's Jurisprudence, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1685, 1690-93 (1991).
Moreover, some evidence that the "Protestant" label may be appropriate comes from the fact
that Sanford Levinson, an erstwhile constitutional Protestant himself, furnished an enthusiastic
cover blurb for The Constitution in Conflict, praising Burt's "well-thought-out attack on the standard notion of judicial supremacy" and approving Burt's argument that the Constitution is "a
communally interpreted document, in which the Court plays an important but not predominant
role" (book jacket).
4. See LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 18-23, 30-37; Grey, supra note 3, at 3, 5-9.
5. LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 23-30.
6. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
7. Sanford Levinson, Tiers of Scrutiny - From Strict Through Rational Bases - and the
Future ofInterests: Commentary on Fiss and Linde, 55 ALBANY L. REV. 745, 747 (1992) (attributing this term to Frank Michelman).
8. Edwin Meese, The Law Of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987); see LEVINSON,
supra note 2, at 39-46.
9. See LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 39-46; see also Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right
This Time?, 293 THE NATION 689, 704; Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, the Supreme Law of
the Land, ar.d Attorney General Meese: A Comment, 61 TuL. L. REV. 1017 (1987).
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wrong. 10 Of course, people disagree about when such defiance is appropriate and, if so, what form it should take. 11 But constitutional
Protestants do not presume interbranch interpretive controversy to be
unhealthy.
Second, and more radically, one might devolve greater authority to
interpret the Constitution upon the citizenry at large. This approach
reduces the importance of all institutional intermediaries in favor of
popular mobilization and engagement. Individual citizens may confront the Constitution directly, like individual sinners contemplating
their God without priests. For example, Robin West has argued that
constitutional adjudication is inherently "authoritarian," "conservative," "hierarchic," "elitist" and "nonparticipatory" 12 - and therefore that constitutional discourse ought to be reclaimed by the
citizenry acting in more participatory modes.
Those who sound such themes do not always agree on the citizenry's capacity for sustained constitutional engagement. Civic republican revivalists such as Cass Sunstein and Frank Michelman have
sometimes seemed to assq.me that deliberative engagement by the citizenry can be more or less continuous. 13 Bruce Ackerman, in contrast,
has suggested that citizens' energy for heightened deliberation on matters of constitutional import is limited, and he has therefore offered a
"dualist" account in which "constitutional moments" of "higher lawmaking" alternate with the default program of "normal politics." 14
Despite these differences in detail, these scholars in common seek to
relativize the conventional liberal distinction between politics and constitutional lawmaking. For them, rights are not trumps but just cards
in the deck. In the words of Ronald Collins and David Skover, such
approaches tend "to reunite constitutionalism with democracy." 15 Or,
in Robin West's words, they seek to repose constitutional authority in
"'We the People' rather than 'They the Court.' " 16
These techniques for unseating the Court from its papal throne in
10. See LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 38-42; GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CON!>'TITUTIONAL
LAW 50-54 (2d ed. 1991). Jefferson's, Jackson's, Lincoln's, and Roosevelt's disagreements with
the Court centered, respectively, on the constitutionality of sedition laws, the Bank of the United
States, slavery, and laws altering the balance of power between labor and capital.
11. For example, declining to enforce a statute the Court has upheld may be less problematic
than prosecuting under a law the Court has struck down. Cf Laurence G. Sager, Fair Measure:
The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
12. Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 71415 (1990).
13. See Frank Michelman, The Supreme Coun, 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97
YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
14. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-7 (1991).
15. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, The Future of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87
MICH. L. REV. 189, 235 (1988).
16. Robin West, The Supreme Coun, 1989 Term - Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously,
104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 106 (1990).
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constitutional interpretation leave open the question of what, exactly,
a nonsupreme Supreme Court is supposed to do. Robert Burt's Constitution in Conflict is an extended meditation on this question. Burt
elaborates the institutional psychodynamic of Protestant constitutionalism: how the Court might internalize a communal rather than a
hierarchical role.
II

Burt himself does not use the terms Catholic and Protestant to
distinguish the ideal of judicial supremacy from the ideal of egalitarian
judicial participation in constitutional dialogue. He organizes the distinction instead around archetypes he derives from American constitutional history, with Hamilton on one side and Madison and Lincoln on
the other. Most of the book is devoted to a detailed historical account
of the dialectic between these two archetypes. But the thrust of the
book is unmistakably normative: Burt argues that the Madison-Lincoln approach is the better one.
The judicial supremacist vision of the Court that Burt deplores has
prevailed ever since Hamilton in Federalist 78 first located the
Supreme Court atop a "hierarchical pyramid" within the national govemment.17 In Burt's view, paradigmatic examples of the Supreme
Court's wrongheaded Hamiltonian decisionmaking include McCulloch
v. Maryland, 18 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 19 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 20 Lochner v. New York, 21 and Roe v. Wade. 22
What error did these various decisions have in common? Not any
substantive error in constitutional interpretation but rather the institutional error of judicial arrogance. In each, the Court deemed itself the
"hierarchically supreme, definitive interpreter[] of the Constitution"
(p. 254). All of these decisions embodied "efforts to interpose judicial
authority in order to suppress direct conflictual interaction among the
contending parties" (p. 247). In each, the Court "fashioned a preemptive weapon" meant to silence dialogue between the opposing sides (p.
349). The result, as Burt characterizes it, was judicially coerced subjugation of one side to the other: "national government [triumphed] over
the states in McCulloch, the southern slaveowners [over the slaves] in
Prigg and Dred Scott, and the propertied few [over the laboring many]
17. P. 53 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).
18. 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (upholding congressional authority to charter a national
bank and invalidating a state effort to tax it); see pp. 132-43.
19. 41 U.S. (1 Pet.) 539 (1842) (invalidating state attempt to bar rendition of fugitive slaves);
see pp. 174-86.
20. 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393 (1857) (invalidating congressional effort to bar slavery from territories); see pp. 188-93.
21. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating state statute limiting bakers' hours); see pp. 253-55.
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating state criminal prohibition against abortion); see pp.
344-52.
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in the Fuller Court decisions generally" (p. 247). Roe too "awarded
total victory to one troop among the combatants" (p. 348).
Contrast all this with the judicial egalitarian vision that Burt associates historically with Madison and Lincoln and urges upon the modem Court. On this view, the Court should not seek "techniques for
conclusively ending conflict" (p. 136) but instead should facilitate
"political conversation" (p. 98) or "precipitate a process of collaboration and accommodation" (p. 131) that advances "the mutual empowerment of both disputants" (p. 267). The Court should coax
disputants into "mutually arriv[ing] at a common characterization"
(p. 98), not act as an "external locus of social control" (p. 97).
Burt attributes this judicial egalitarian approach originally to
Madison. Federalist 10 and Federalist 51 argued for interior rather
than exterior checks on government power through the technique of
"dividing and then subdividing authority within and among the various institutions of govemance." 23 Burt reads these texts to imply that
the Court is " 'co-ordinate' with rather than hierarchically superior to
the other federal branches in interpreting the Constitution." 24 On this
view, social conflict is not to be siphoned off into courts but rather
worked out in deliberative political forums where "alienated and potentially hostile rivals come to see one another as reciprocally connected fellow-citizens. "25
Lincoln likewise had an "aversion to coercion" (p. 90), Burt argues. Given his "egalitarian conception of political relations" (p. 100),
he preferred "persuasion" (p. 85) and "mutuality" (p. 90) to external
force. On this reading, how can one explain Lincoln's command of
the Union army in the Civil War? This might seem a "considerable
paradox" (p. 85), Burt concedes. But according to Burt, even force
can be true to the equality principle so long as it is merely defensively
designed to restore the status quo ante another's aggression; this is
"the only way that coercion can be justified within the democratic
ethos" (p. 85). True to this approach, Lincoln aimed "only at the restoration of an equal, mutually consensual relationship" between North
and South (p. 85). Lincoln's conception of the judicial role, like
Madison's, was nonsupremacist. The Supreme Court's interpretations
of the Constitution were fallible - Dred Scott was Exhibit A. If people deferred too much to " 'that eminent tribunal,' " Lincoln warned
in his first inaugural address, they would "'cease[] to be their own
rulers' " (pp. 98-99).
23. P. 60 (citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison)).
24. P. 74. Jefferson Powell has challenged the historical accuracy of Burt's reading of
Madison as an opponent of judicial supremacy. See H. Jefferson Powell, Enslaved to Judicial
Supremacy?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1205-11 (1993) (book review).
25. P. 96. In this respect, Burt's reading of Madison echoes the civic republican reading of
Madison. See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 1558-64.
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As paradigmatic examples of the Supreme Court's constitutional
interpretation in the Madison-Lincoln mode, Burt cites Marbury v.
Madison 26 and Brown v. Board of Education. 27 Burt reads both decisions in a revisionist light; neither, he says, stands for the assertion of
judicial supremacy conventionally attributed to them. In Marbury, a
"Madisonian Marshall" (p. 119) fended off the efforts of a Republican
executive and legislature to "subjugate the judiciary" (p. 121) by declining to side decisively with the Federalist Marbury, thus cleverly
"avoid[ing] a conclusive resolution of the dispute" (p. 125). He gave
"room on all sides for recourse to negotiated settlement" (p. 128),
which led Jefferson gradually to back off from attacking the Federalist-dominated Court (p. 131).
Likewise, Burt argues, Brown v. Board imposed a "stalemate" on
the warring parties rather than awarding a conclusive victory to black
Southerners over white (p. 293). Playing down the judicial supremacist rhetoric of Cooper v. Aaron, 28 Burt argues that Brown is the "central example" in our constitutional history of judicial egalitarianism
toward the political branches (p. 3). Contrary to popular belief, Brown
was not vindicated when federal troops escorted black students up the
steps of Little Rock High - the scene depicted, perhaps ironically, in
the cover photo of the book. Rather, the Court's cautious, interactive
approach was vindicated nearly twenty years later when Congress
passed, and the President signed, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
related legislation (pp. 300-04). In Burt's view, the Court's call for
"all deliberate speed" in the second Brown v. Board ofEducation 29 was
not a cowardly capitulation to southern white resistance but rather a
stroke of judicial egalitarian genius. The Court was self-consciously
soliciting congressional and executive response that it would have stifled had it intervened more decisively in favor of black civil rights.
What prescription follows for the modern Court? Return to the
Madisonian path, says Burt. Roe v. Wade, he suggests, is a textbook
illustration of the evils of judicial supremacism: by "award[ing] total
victory" to the prochoice side, the Court cut off "conversation" with
opponents of abortion, thus licensing prochoice advocates to say to
prolifers " 'I am entitled to ignore your distress' " (pp. 348-49). Far
from ending polarized social conflict over the abortion issue, the Court
merely fanned the flames. What would have been the better, Madisonian way? Let a patchwork of differing abortion regimes develop
among the states and merely enforce pregnant women's right to interstate travel (pp. 350-51).
26. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see pp. 271-96.
27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. See 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (holding that the Supreme Court's "exposition of the Constitution ... is the supreme law of the land ...") (emphasis added); see pp. 286-94.
29. 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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Putting this same point more generally, Burt suggests that the
Court should intervene in social conflicts not to confer victory on
either side but rather to "assure that no combatant conclusively
prevails over the other" (p. 359). How might it go about doing this?
First, the Court should remove itself from sharp disputes over substantive questions, remanding them to the political branches via the
Bickelian passive virtues: ripeness, mootness, standing, political question, and clear statement doctrine (pp. 359-62), or whatever else will
invite what Bickel called a " 'continuing colloquy with the political
institutions and with society at large.' " 30 Second, if the Court must
reach the merits, Burt argues, it should use the balancing approach
characteristic of "so-called 'middle-tier' constitutional scrutiny" (p.
362) rather than bright-line rules. 31 Such balancing "permits and even
invites a legislative response" (p. 364) by employing "particularistic,
contextually circumscribed, tentatively offered judicial interventions,"
a contrast with both "grand-style moral philosophizing" and mere
"surrender to majority will" (pp. 367-68). On this view, decisions
such as City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 32 are steps in
the right direction. Short of Roe never having issued in the first place,
the "undue burden" test set forth in Planned Parenthood v. Casey 33
would presumably be Burt's idea of second best.
III
The Constitution in Crisis is a serious, thoughtful, and often insightful book. It undertakes a patient and detailed reconstruction of
our constitutional history. It tries to map out a socially useful role for
the Supreme Court in the face of our deep divisions and repeated tendencies to engage in "Manichean politics" and the "clash of moral
absolutes" (p. 355). With such virtues to commend it, why did I find
Burt's argument so unpersuasive?
One might be tempted to chalk up my resistance to a constitutional
Catholic bias, to which I freely confess. But that is not the whole
story. It seems to me that, even in Protestant terms, Burt's book does
not make a clear case for so greatly diminishing the role of the Court
in enforcing constitutional rights. There are two possible crises of
faith that might drive the Protestant argument. The first is loss of
faith that constitutional litigation at the Court can be an effective vehi30. P. 23 (citing ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 240 (1962)).

THE

31. On this distinction in constitutional law generally, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, The
Supreme Court, 1991 Term - Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 22 (1992).
32. 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (declining to hold the mentally retarded a suspect class, but employing heightened rationality review to invalidate a city's exclusion of a group home for the mentally
retarded from a residential neighborhood).
33. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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cle for bringing about social or political change. The second is loss of
faith that the Court can articulate the content of constitutional rights.
Burt seems little driven by the first and equivocal about the second.
Let us start with the first possibility: loss of faith in the Court.
Some Court defetishizers come right out and admit that their turn
from the Court is pragmatically motivated. As Robin West puts it,
"necessity partly dictates this redirection of liberal energies." 34 She
suggests that, after a quarter-century drought in Democratic nomina·
tions to the Court and decades of "adversely narrow judicial interpre·
tation" of the Constitution, 35 anyone in her right mind would turn to
cultivating social and political change in other forums. Such arguments draw support from recent social science literature suggesting
that, even in its heyday, the Warren Court was never really much of a
catalyst of social change. The leading example is Gerald N. Rosenberg's 1991 book, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change?, which answered mostly "no" to the question in its subtitle. 36
At moments, Burt sounds a similar pragmatic concern about consequences. In this mode, he suggests that judicial supremacism can be
politically counterproductive. For example, he adds his voice to the
now fashionable chorus saying that, but for Roe's "artless intervention" (p. 350), the political process inexorably would have lifted restrictions on abortion and we would not have antiabortion terrorists
blocking abortion clinic doors today (pp. 348-52). Like any
counterfactual, this can neither be proven nor disproven. But I
strongly doubt whether politics alone would have outperformed Roe in
advancing reproductive rights. First, this hypothesis ignores the culture-shaping effect of constitutional adjudication; once something has
been held a right, it has clout in the political process that it would not
have if it were called, say, a special interest. 37 Second, it is hardly
clear that political talk would have done any more than judicial fiat to
unsettle the deep convictions of those who condemn abortion as murder. Burt favors the optimistic view that American social relations are
"amenable to peaceful compromise" (p. 259), but our recent national
experience - consider not only abortion but also the debate over gay
service members in the military - furnishes plenty of justification for
Hobbesian pessimism. By underestimating the intractability of deeply
held convictions, Burt undervalues the pragmatic attractiveness of supremacist courts.
Far more important to Burt than the pragmatic argument, how34. West, supra note 16, at 93.
35. Id.
36. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991). For a review of The Hollow Hope, see Stephen L. Carter, Do Courts Matter?,
90 MICH. L. REV. 1216 (1992) (book review).
37. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 193.94 (1990)
(arguing that Roe begat the prochoice political movement, not the other way around).
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ever, is his apparent philosophical skepticism toward constitutional
rights. Lack of foundations troubles him more than loss of Court
seats. This is most evident from the "equality principle" he makes the
linchpin of the book.
This principle arises out of what Burt calls "an internal contradiction in democratic theory between majority rule and equal self-determination" (p. 29). In a democracy of equals, the only legitimate
decisions are those produced by unanimity, or "mutual consent" (p.
101). "[C]oercion in any form is the enemy of democratic life" (p.
375). Burt defines "coercion" exceptionally broadly: "coercion can
occur on the battlefield, in a legislature, or in a courtroom," whether
by "force of arms," "by majority vote or by judicial override on behalf
of the previously defeated minority" (p. 29). In all three settings, the
losing party has been "coerc[ed]," "subjugat[ed]," or "enslav[ed]" (pp.
28-29, 235, 282-83).
This is a very idiosyncratic definition of coercion. It is at odds
with any conventional understanding of constitutionalism. In labeling
majority rule and judicial review "coercion," Burt flies in the face of
three centuries of social contract theory maintaining that ex ante
precommitment to constitutional procedures precludes ex post sour
grapes about particular outcomes.
If not from the Constitution, where does Burt's equality principle
come from? Apparently from an elementary psychological model to
which Burt would reduce all social conflict: "[I]magine you, me and a
third person in the same room. Two of us decide that you should give
your life to serve us"; if "we" win, then "you" will feel "enslave[d]"
(pp. 27-28). Burt implies that if "you" convinced a court to enjoin
"us," then "we" too would feel "enslaved." "No matter who wins, the
principle of self-rule is defeated" (p. 29).
By reducing all constitutional antagonists to repeat players in this
elementary drama, Burt forecloses the possibility of normative judgment about which claims to subjugation are better. To Burt, all players are equal candidates for the experience of subjugation, because that
experience is in the eye of the beholder. Thus, slavery "subjugat[ed]"
slaves, but the Civil War and Reconstruction likewise "subjugat[ed]"
former slaveholders (p. 77). Jim Crow laws "subordinated" black
Southerners, but overturning Jim Crow would "subordinate[]" white
Southerners (p. 19). Blacks and whites, the Court and the President,
the national government and the states, Federalists and Republicans,
advocates for and against reproductive choice - each can "subjugate"
the other at any time.
One need not be a moral realist to think that constitutional antagonists are not so morally fungible. Some feelings of unequal treatment
may be better legitimated against some backdrop cultural understanding of subjugation than others. Just because losers feel subordinated
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does not mean that they are right. Bakke38 might feel just as much the
victim of race discrimination as Plessy, 39 but a coherent account of
equal protection may be given to explain why Plessy's feelings are jus·
tified and Bakke's are not. By universalizing the concept of subjuga·
tion, Burt treats powerful and pariah as equivalent.
Burt's value skepticism, in any event, founders on an internal con·
sideration. Although he suggests that constitutional judgment rests
"wholly on the subjective evaluations of the social disputants them·
selves" (p. 97), such subjectivism is belied by the central moral com·
mand of the book: "thou shalt not subjugate." Burt cannot
simultaneously deny all objective values and affirm this one as the ulti·
mate trump.
If Burt is not, after all, a value skeptic, perhaps be is simply a judge
skeptic - arguing not that there are no values but only that the Court
is institutionally inferior to the contending parties at articulating
them. 40 On this view, the Court plays as psychotherapist - it can
facilitate agreement, but the contending parties really have to want to
change. This is a far thinner role for the Court than the already thin
role assigned it by Burt's acknowledged intellectual progenitor, Alex·
ander Bickel.41 Like Bickel, Burt sees the Court as a participant in an
ongoing and interactive dialogue with other political institutions and
society at large. But if Burt is skeptical about the Court's competence
to articulate constitutional rights, it is unclear why it should have even
this thin role. Bickel at least thought that the Court, given its political
insulation and its professional culture, had a real comparative advan·
tage at talking. In Burt's vision, it is no longer clear why, when the
Court talks, anyone should listen to it more than to anyone else.

38. See University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
39. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
40. Jefferson Powell shrewdly links this aspect of Burt's argument to the proceduralist ethics
of Richard Rorty. See Powell, supra note 24, at 1215-17.
41. See pp. 20-33.

